[Note: This edition of Settlements in Focus does NOT address the controversy over new tenders recently issued by the Government of Israel for the construction of 307 new units in Har Homa, a settlement located in southeast Jerusalem. We will cover this issue in detail in an upcoming edition. For further reading at this time, we recommend the December 12th lead editorial in Ha’aretz, as well as Akiva Eldar's December 10th column in Ha’aretz.]

Before coming to Annapolis, Prime Minister Olmert announced that Israel would not establish any new settlements. Is this statement meaningful?
With respect to Olmert’s “bold” commitment to not build new settlements, this commitment is nothing more than a reiteration of a policy that is more than a decade old. In 1996, the Israeli government declared that Israel would establish no new settlements, and subsequent governments have repeated this commitment. Since the original declaration, the debate has focused not on the establishment of new settlements, but rather on the question of expansion of existing settlements, with Israel arguing that existing settlements should be allowed to continue to expand via “natural growth” and the Palestinians and the international community arguing that such growth was not “natural” and should not be permitted. It should be noted that Phase I of the Roadmap explicitly requires Israel to stop all settlement expansion, including expansion due to “natural growth.” (For an excellent discussion of the controversy over “natural growth and what it does or does not mean, we recommend this 2001 analysis by Geoffrey Aronson, of the Foundation for Middle East Peace).
Although Israel has officially committed itself to a “no new settlements” policy for more than a decade, on the ground Israel has unofficially established around 100 new settlements which are illegal even from the Israeli point of view. The story of the establishment of these “illegal outposts” – which are in effect proto-settlements – was told in the report prepared at the request of then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon by attorney Talia Sasson. For details of that report - click here.
A real "no new settlements" policy should mean not only refraining from establishing new settlements, but also dismantling all of the new settlements that have sprung up in the form of illegal outposts. Unfortunately, thus far there is no evidence that this is what Olmert means by his commitment.

Even before coming to Annapolis last month, some Israeli government officials seemed to be trying to pre-empt pressure by claiming that the government has already "frozen" settlements by refraining from issuing new construction permits. Is this claim true?
On the ground we do not see any change. There are currently hundreds of housing units being built in many of the settlements, both legal and illegal. Actually, today the construction is going on more or less as described in Peace Now's latest report, issued at the beginning of November, and covering settlement activity from May-October 2007. As noted in the conclusion of that report, "...in recent months the government of Israel has declared in different contexts its intention to freeze construction in settlements. It was recently published that the defense minister froze approval of construction plans as part of ‘applying pressure’ on the settlers in the negotiations over evacuating the outposts. However, the Defense Minister’s office did not confirm there really was such an order. It appears to be an attempt by the settlers to 'raise the price' in negotiations with them and create the impression they are being restricted..."

How has the government of Israel defined a "settlement freeze"?
Defining what a "settlement freeze" would mean on the ground, and what it would require in terms of changes in Israeli behavior, is a political game. Settler advocates in the Israeli government (as well as settler advocates and sympathizers in the U.S. government) have consistently pressed for a definition that permits as much construction as possible. In the past, the debate focused on the location of construction. Settler advocates and allies (in both the Israeli and U.S. governments) argued that a freeze should mean that a settlement did not expand in terms of its footprint on the ground, but construction should be permitted within the already built-up area of a settlement, ostensibly to accommodate the so-called natural growth needs of the settlers. This approach led, predictably, to a conflict over how to demarcate the built-up areas of settlements, with settler advocates and allies seeking to define the area in the broadest possible sense and render even this "freeze" meaningless. This conflict was never resolved and effectively derailed efforts to define a "settlement freeze." More recently, the debate has expanded to focus on the status of the construction in question. Settler advocates and allies in such a scenario would define a "settlement freeze" along the following lines:
Freezing construction that has not yet started. According to this argument, the government of Israel could "freeze" settlements by not permitting construction that is already planned but not yet approved. This definition of a "settlement freeze" is problematic, since it explicitly permits the continuation of all those projects that are already underway. This is a huge loophole, allowing the continuation of the construction on hundreds of units and associated infrastructure. Worse still, it does not offer a clear definition of what constitutes a project that has already "started." This widens the loophole to potentially permit settlement expansion on a massive scale. For example, under this "freeze," would it be permissible to go ahead with construction of a new house or apartment building so long as work on the foundations had already commenced (meaning the project had already "started")? Similarly, would it be permissible to go ahead with construction in a new section of a settlement, so long as the road connecting the settlement to the new construction site was already in the process of being paved? What about projects for which construction permits have been issued and/or apartments already marketed, pre-construction? These are not random hypotheticals – there are many projects like this right now in the West Bank, and it is not clear that under this definition of a settlement freeze, any of these projects would have to stop.
A test case for this is a huge new neighborhood of around 600 units, called "Agan Ha'ayalot," planned in the settlement of Giv'at Ze'ev. The neighborhood plan was approved in 1999. At the time, a few houses were built, but the builders did not succeed in selling the units (probably due to violence at the beginning of the second Intifada) and the project stopped. Today, the builders have begun marketing the units, with some success, to a Haredi (fervent Orthodox) population, and some of the original contractors have applied to renew their construction permits, which have expired. Under this definition of a settlement "freeze," it seems clear that the government of Israel could, if it chose, view this as "already started" construction and go ahead and permit the construction of a huge new neighborhood, even though the project has been de facto frozen for nearly a decade and the building permits are expired (assuming all of the units were built and marketed to the fervently Orthodox, who have large families, it is reasonable to estimate that the new neighborhood would become home to 4000-5000 people).
Freezing any future plans. Under this formulation, a "settlement freeze" would mean that the government of Israel would allow any already-approved planned construction to go ahead, but freeze approval of any new plans. This approach is even more problematic, since it would mean that the construction of literally thousands of new housing units could go ahead; over the years many plans have been approved and are pending implementation. Indeed, at a ministerial committee meeting on December 11, 2007, the head of the Civil Administration was quoted as confirming that there are thousands of approved housing units ready to be built.

What would constitute a meaningful settlement freeze?
"Freezing settlements" means halting ALL construction activity. This has not happened. It means stopping the bulldozers, including those operating in the "settlement blocks" and/or west of Israel's security barrier. While these latter areas may be within the so-called Israeli national consensus and may well become part of Israel in the future, at this point they are part of the area whose status must be resolved through negotiations, not through continued Israeli efforts to put houses and people on the ground. Any other definition of a settlement freeze is not serious. Any other definition will be exploited by settlers and their advocates to continue construction, and any other definition will signal to the Palestinians and the world that Israel is not sincere about negotiations.
While Prime Minister Olmert might claim that it is difficult to stop construction that has already been approved, marketed, etc., the fact is that the Government of Israel has the authority and ability to stop even this construction. It has done so in the past (during the Rabin era, construction projects were cancelled and the government offered compensation to people who had already purchased the units in question. Doing so is just a matter of political will. This is not to minimize the massive settlement expansion that occurred under Rabin, but rather to not that there is a precedent for canceling construction.)
From a political perspective, the government of Israel should also keep in mind that pandering to the settlers and their allies has never succeeded in quelling their opposition to the peace process. To the contrary, such efforts have in the past only emboldened the settlers and in particular the extremist elements in the movement that see any bargain on settlements as a poison pill. For further analysis - click here.

Just before and just after Annapolis, Peace Now issued reports regarding new settler tactics to expand settlements and outposts illegally. Can you explain briefly what these reports found?
Peace Now has long documented the ways in which settlers seek to evade rules and laws that do not suit their needs. The fact that the government is at best half-hearted in enforcing the rule of law against the settlers only reinforces the settlers’ view that it is their right to behave this way.
The first of the two recent reports examined a new ploy adopted by settlers to expand settlements. Some months ago, the government of Israel established a new policy barring the transfer of new caravans to the settlements, after it became clear that settlers were abusing caravans to expand settlements without permits. In response, the settlers began importing the components of new caravans (walls, windows, floors) to the settlements, and then assembling the new caravans on site. Peace Now discovered that in this manner, over the past 6 months the settlers established more than 100 new units in settlements. Since the original Peace Now report on this phenomenon, Peace Now has discovered dozens of additional new caravans in another settlement, Dolev.
In many other cases, the settlers simply break the law, building and developing without any approval from the government. These violations have been exposed by Peace Now in several reports (for example: Construction on Private Palestinian Lands, construction beyond the jurisdiction, in nature reserves etc.). The latest report by Peace Now shows that such infractions of the law are known to the authorities, but still nothing is being done to stop them. The Civil Administration has an inspection unit which reports on illegal construction and issues demolition orders. The report shows that out of thousands of demolition orders against illegal construction in settlements, only 3% were implemented.
In short, the government of Israel continues to support the settlement enterprise actively, through public investment, construction, and approvals, but also passively, by failing to enforce the law to any meaningful degree.

At Annapolis, Olmert recommitted Israel to the Roadmap, which includes obligations on settlements and outposts. Is Israel now likely to meet these obligations?
The government of Israel has committed repeatedly to a settlement freeze but, as discussed above, has never implemented one. It has also repeatedly committed to evacuate illegal outposts – something that it should do according to Israeli law, according to the Roadmap, according to Israeli direct commitments articulated verbally and in writing to the U.S., and according to rulings of the Israeli High Court of Justice. Although these commitments and obligations are explicit and clear, the government of Israel continues to bypass them. The reasons behind Israel’s evasion of its commitments on settlements and outposts are largely political, and there is little reason to assume that the political calculus will change much in the wake of Annapolis. The key political considerations for Olmert are:
Coalition politics: Olmert presides over an extremely broad coalition (in terms of ideology). One of the most important coalition partners is the far right-wing “Yisrael Beiteinu” party, with 11 members of Knesset – a party headed by Avigdor Lieberman, a settler himself and a fierce advocate of settler interests. Yisrael Beiteinu has repeatedly declared that as soon as one outpost is touched the party will leave the government [ironically, Leiberman is himself a member of the ministerial committee charged with dealing with the recommendations of the Sasson Report]. In addition, another important coalition partner is the Shas party, with 12 members of the Knesset. Shas opposes the Annapolis process and might also leave the coalition if Olmert takes action against outposts.
Election politics: Olmert is no doubt aware that if his government falls, and particularly if it is perceived to have fallen as a result of steps he has taken in the peace process, the next election will almost certainly produce a government that will snuff out any serious hopes at a substantive renewal of negotiations. For Israeli politicians in the current government who have a genuine commitment to peace with the Palestinians, the fear that if their efforts fail once again the peace process will become “radioactive” politically likely weighs heavily upon them.
The right vs. the wrong moment for action: Given his complicated coalition, it is likely that Olmert is tempted to adopt the logic of previous prime ministers, to the effect that it is better to refrain from upsetting the coalition over an interim step (like dismantling outposts) and instead focus his energy and stockpile his political capital for the “full deal.” It should be recalled that this strategy was adopted by leaders before Olmert, including Rabin and Barak, without success – in each case, opponents of the peace process were not mollified and in fact redoubled their efforts to undermine the process, while failure to deliver changes on the ground eroded Palestinian confidence in the peace process. The situation today is no different. If Olmert doesn't deliver anything on the ground, the impact on the peace process will likely be devastating. Abbas’ government is already very weak, and if Abbas can't show his people that his leadership can deliver changes and improvements on the ground, he will be further weakened, to the direct benefit of Hamas and others who oppose the negotiating process.
The Settlers as Spoilers: The settler movement has succeeded in convincing the Israeli public, and the politicians, that trying to remove any settler or settlement could well involve violence and a national trauma. In the past, settler opposition to evacuations has at times crossed the line separating legitimate protest from violence; this has included violence against members of the police and IDF who are trying to enforce the law. The Israeli public was deeply troubled by images of police officers and soldiers dragging young men and women, kicking and screaming, away from settlements during the disengagement from Gaza. Worse yet, the public was traumatized by the images of settlers throwing stones at police officers and the violent reaction of the police during the evacuation and demolition of part of the outpost of Amona (see: Amona house demolition). That being said, the Israeli police and the IDF are well-trained and capable of handling a civilian demonstration, including knowing how to deal professionally and effectively with protesters who insist on being dragged from a given site.
In addition, the Gaza disengagement and the Amona demolitions gave birth to a new protest movement inside the IDF, with soldiers who are sympathetic to the settlers (often supported by high-profile pro-settler rabbis), vowing to refuse orders to evacuate settlers. Given the centrality of the IDF in the Israeli identity and ethos, the specter of the IDF torn apart over this issue is deeply troubling to many Israelis. The reality is, however, that such threats have thus far failed to transform into reality: only a handful of soldiers refused to participate in disengagement, and more recently, after dozens of soldiers declared they would not take part in the eviction of two settler families squatting on Palestinian property in Hebron, in the end only a few individuals refused. The fact that the government takes the threats so seriously should in many ways be more troubling than the threats themselves – the idea that a democracy might adjust its policies in response to soldiers threatening to refuse orders on political-ideological grounds should call into question the strength of that democracy and its commitment to the rule of law.

After Annapolis, Defense Minister Barak announced his support for a plan to offer compensation to residents of settlements located east of the security barrier who wish to evacuate voluntarily. What is the significance of this announcement?
Barak's declaration is important, above all, because it brings public attention and debate to an issue that the settlers have tried their best to conceal for many years, and especially since the Gaza disengagement: that there are many settlers who are ready to leave their homes if they are compensated and offered the opportunity to rebuild their lives inside Israel. It also underscores the growing sentiment, among both Israeli officials and the general public, that the barrier marks the line beyond which settlers and settlements no longer have a place.
This fact is problematic for the settler leadership. It weakens their claims and also proves that they do not represent all the settlers. It also strengthens existing and growing divisions between the interests of settlers living east and west of the barrier.
For some time, now there has been a bill pending in the Knesset, initiated by Meretz MK Avshalom Vilan and Labor MK Colette Avital, which seeks to mandate such compensation to settlers. There is also a non-profit organization (called “Bayit Ehad” – “One Home”) that is working to build support for this bill inside the Knesset and among the general public. Although there are many supporters of the idea, it seems that in the current Knesset, if brought to a vote the bill would likely fail. However, Barak’s declaration might indicate that increasing numbers of MK's are adopting the idea, and maybe in the future they will be able to muster a majority vote.